Wo makes an interesting point: if someones believes in strong necessities despite appropriately conceivable counterexamples, on what grounds do they reject the idea of "strong possibilities", i.e. contradictions or inconceivabilities that are nonetheless held to be metaphysically possible?
In fact, I used to be pretty sympathetic to such a view. If modality isn't tied to the rational sphere, then it's hard to see how we could say anything much about it at all! (Though I recently took a shot at reconciling a deeply "realist" conception of modality with the epistemic strength of the modal rationalist, here.)
Saturday, March 03, 2007
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There are basically two ways I think can make sense of (modal) possibilities.
ReplyDeleteOne of course is the Tegmarkian ensemble view. (one sense in which "everything" not only is possible but is)
The other is to regard modal calculi as modeling simulations in the brain.
yeah I tend towards answers like the Tegmarkian ensemble view (although the other is another way to look at it).
ReplyDeleteIt seems to me that Philosophy sometimess stumbles into the realm of physics (or psychology) and then ignores their findings.